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ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR PRODUCT COMPONENT INTEGRATION
Managers and researchers have increasingly recognized product development as a core capability
in organizations. Recent trends, however, are challenging firms' abilities to perform this central
activity. Technologies are simultaneously becoming more complex and advancing at an ever
increasing rate. Projects are becoming more distributed across geographic and functional
boundaries-all of which is taking place in the context of fierce global competition. This study
builds upon a long tradition of research in new product development, which stresses the
importance of coordination as a way to meet such challenges. It compares approaches to product
component integration in six large-scale software development projects at two firms. The
analysis identified three general approaches to product component integration: "big-bang," "roll-
up," and "continuous" integration. These approaches differed along multiple dimensions: task
allocation, resource investment, incentive structure, and timing. Teams experienced increased
cooperation and fewer problems when a dedicated, highly experienced group internal to the
project performed the process. This team drew upon a variety of structural and social incentive
mechanisms to ensure cooperation. The paper offers an extension to theory by identifying some
key design decisions that facilitate component integration and provide other benefits such as
enhanced cooperation and motivation among project team members.
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INTRODUCTION
Managers and researchers have increasingly recognized product development as a core
capability in organizations. While research in product development enjoys a long and illustrious
history (Brown and Eisenhardt April 1995), recent trends are challenging firms' abilities to
perform this central activity. Technologies are simultaneously becoming more complex and
advancing at an ever increasing rate, while projects are becoming more distributed across
geographic and functional boundaries. And all of this is taking place in the context of more rapid
and fierce global competition.
Improved coordination appears as a common thread in the literature on how firms should
respond to such challenges (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Allen 1977; lansiti and Clark 1994).
Thus, for example, we see numerous studies on integration processes across functions
(Dougherty May 1992), projects (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1992; Meyer and Lehnerd 1997) and
time (Gersick 1988). Other researchers stress the influence of team and/or product size and
structure on coordination costs. The focus on the role of modularization in system construction is
a recent example (Von Hippel 1990). Optimal strategies for system testing and integration
(Koushik and Mookerjee 1995) and development environments and tools are also topics of
current study (Boehm January 1984). Particularly popular in this line of research are concepts
related to concurrent or simultaneous engineering. These concepts emphasize a multifunctional
team structure with close working relationships among representatives of product design,
marketing, manufacturing, etc., fostered by, for example, overlapping development cycles
(Nonaka 1990).
An over-riding message coming out of this body of work is that (1) integration is key to
project success and (2) the earlier and more frequently integration is performed, the more likely a
project is to succeed (Wheelwright and Clark 1992; Cusumano and Selby 1995). The strength of
this result has tended to obscure certain other important questions. For instance, what is the ideal
integration schedule-daily, weekly, monthly? And how does this vary by type of project? More
importantly, what are the underlying mechanisms that render frequent integration so effective?
Nor do we have an adequate understanding of how projects can achieve such a result.
Particularly on large scale efforts extending over several months or years, achieving integration
on a regular basis may involve a complex set of organizational and managerial decisions. Finally,
it is not clear that integration speed and frequency are the only benefits of a well-designed
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integration process. There may be other advantages such as enhanced morale and cooperation
that are equally important in terms of team functioning and project success.
The goal of this research is to assist large-scale product development projects to achieve
integration more easily and consistently. Several aspects of this work distinguish it from
traditional research on the topic. First, it focuses on the development of complex software
products that involve several hundred people and where the organizational solution is not as
simple as forming a multifunctional team. Second, it strives to improve the efficiency of the
entire development effort by focusing on the coordination of multiple interdependencies. Most
researchers limit their analyses to isolated engineering tasks or coordination of a few functions.
Finally, and most significantly, this research adopts an organizational design perspective to the
problem of achieving integration.
COORDINATION ON LARGE SCALE PROJECTS
Building and maintaining an automobile, aircraft, computer, or software system
represents an extremely complex activity (Brooks 1975; Wheelwright and Clark 1992;
Cusumano and Selby 1995; Sabbagh 1995). This complexity arises not only from the inherent
complexity of the technology but also due to the difficulties associated with managing the
development process.
For example, software systems typically consist of millions of lines of code grouped into
hundreds or thousands of files; those lines may execute hundreds of different functions. The first
version of Microsoft Windows NT consisted of 5.6 million lines of code organized into 40,000
files. At the peak of the development cycle, approximately 200 developers were working on the
NT effort (Zachary 1994). Data further suggest that this complexity may increase over time. One
successful real-time telecommunications switching system in its eighth version of release
currently stands at 10 million lines of non-commented code divided into 41 different subsystems.
Three thousand engineers contribute to its production and maintenance. Nor is this scale and
complexity limited to software products, as evidenced by recent data on the Boeing 777 project
(Sabbagh 1995).
Because the products themselves are so large and complex, and schedules are usually
tight, companies often try to carry out such development efforts in highly distributed, though
interdependent, teams. Literally hundreds or even thousands of individuals whose activities are
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highly related contribute aspects of the product in parallel. For example, people working on parts
in the same subsystem need to coordinate with respect to their design and testing. They also need
to interact with people working on other subsystems that interface or interact with some of these
components, with representatives from other functional areas such as marketing or customer
support, and potentially with people on other projects within the firm. Managers face the
problem of how to best design such a coordination effort while still meeting the project goals,
schedule, and budget.
References from case studies of large-scale development projects highlight both the
importance and the difficulty of achieving such balance. One telling indicator of coordination
cost is data on design changes. For example, during the construction of the Boeing 777 airplane,
the team working on a 20 piece wing flap found 251 interferences where parts occupied the same
coordinates in space. All design activity on the project had to be suspended every few weeks
during the main design phase. During these periods, team members looked for problems arising
because of the interference between one subsystem or set of parts and another (Sabbagh 1995).
Design changes in software development tend to be even more frequent and costly. On
the first version of Microsoft Windows NT, there were 150-200 component changes per day in
the weeks leading up to release (Zachary 1994). A major telecommunications subsystem
experienced approximately 132,000 changes over its 12 year history (averaging approximately
30 per day). As many as 35-40 different team members might "touch" parts of that subsystem on
any given day.
Theories and empirical data also support the hypothesis that coordination costs can easily
overwhelm or interfere with a team's productive capacity. For instance, the amount of
coordination on a team depends on the number of communication links that team members need
to establish and increases non-linearly with team size (Brooks 1975; Allen 1977). McCabe's data
indicate that typical programmers spend 50% of their time interacting with other team members
(McCabe 1976). Observational studies at one large firm revealed that people spent one-half of
their time in meetings, and developers attended one meeting, on average, for every line of code
they wrote. Interviews with programmers and system engineers working on software
development projects also suggest that, as the size of the team increases, communication
overhead on the project can quickly get out of hand (Perry, Staudenmayer et al. July 1994).
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One popular way of conceptualizing the development process is as a series of
implementation steps with iterative relationships between successive phases: system
requirements, software requirements, analysis, program design, coding, testing, operations, and
maintenance. This waterfall-like approach, which tries to simplify the process by "freezing" a
product specification early and then integrating and testing the system at the end, was common in
the 1970's and 1980's and remains popular in many industries (Cusumano and Selby 1995).
Recently, however, some researchers have begun to explore alternative development
models such as "iterative enhancement" or "spiral" (Boehm January 1984), "concurrent
development" (Pimmler and Eppinger 1994), "synch and stabilize" (Cusumano and Selby 1995),
and "interpretive" (Piore, Lester et al. 1997). These authors argue that in many industries user
needs and desires are so difficult to understand and evolve so rapidly that tasks are much more
overlapping and inter-related than commonly supposed. As a result, it is impossible and unwise
to design the system completely in advance. Instead, projects should "iterate" as well as
concurrently manage as many activities as possible while they move forward to completing the
project (Cusumano and Selby 1995). An alternative conceptualization of product development is,
therefore, repeated occurrences of a sequence consisting of a development phase and a
coordination phase.
The coordination of tasks is clearly a key requirement for project success and yet difficult
to achieve. Integration may also be getting more complicated as technologies grow more
complex, malleable, and interconnected and industries and markets become more volatile. We
therefore need a more sophisticated understanding of how managers can achieve integration.
Three research questions, in particular, would seem to be important: (1) What are some
alternative approaches to integration, and how are they distinguished in terms of organizational
design? (2) What is their impact on project performance? and (3) What underlying mechanisms
account for those outcomes? In order to address these questions, this study focused on one
integration process in six teams at two companies, as described below.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
We collected data regarding six large-scale software development efforts in two firms
using multiple methods, including observation and interviews. Cook and Campbell suggest that
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multi-method analyses are particularly appropriate when conducting comparative investigations
(Cook and Campbell 1979). An embedded, multiple case design was used (Yin 1984).
Domain and Sample. The two companies, Lucent Technologies and Microsoft, are in
the telecommunications and personal computer (PC) software industries, respectively. Lucent's
Network Systems division, the focus of this study, produces switching systems that connect
telephone calls and employs approximately 30,000 people. Microsoft, with an employee base of
about 20,000, produces software applications and operating systems for the PC market and,
increasingly, multimedia, consumer and Internet applications. Both companies generate over $1
billion annually. Industry analysts consider both leaders in their respective industries.
Both Lucent and Microsoft also currently operate in a very competitive environment
undergoing significant technical and market transition. In terms of their product development
efforts, this translates into a need to develop very large, complex software products that are
reliable, competitive in terms of their feature set, and attractive to customers. Competitive
pressures further dictate that this be done quickly and efficiently.
Although the two firms face a very similar technical and market situation, they do so
from very different historical legacies of success. For example, Microsoft has traditionally
operated by instituting per product loyalty and focus. This approach is being increasingly
challenged, however, as its products increase in size and become more integrated and system-
like (Cusumano and Selby 1995). Lucent, in contrast, is making a transition from being a
producer of bundled system products to largely unbundled features. Thus, although the issues
concerning product development at the two sites are quite similar, each firm's response strategy
in terms of how they manage their integration process should be quite different. The firms also
differ markedly in terms of their age and culture. This heterogeneity ensures a wide range of
management outcomes consistent with the goals of the study.
The criteria used to select products for the study were: (1) large size and complexity in
terms of the amount of code and the number of components; (2) large team size; and (3) products
which were almost or already introduced to the market, to eliminate variance due to development
stage. The selected projects varied in terms of their (1) degree of innovation (approximately half
incorporated new or unfamiliar technology for the firm and/or were marketed to new users); (2)
position in the system architecture (some were at the user interface level while others interfaced
with hardware); and (3) success (as defined initially by upper management in each firm). We
7
based the choice of selection factors on past research (Kemerer 1997; Boehm January 1984) and
discussions with experts in the field.
Methods and Data Sources. Data for the study consisted primarily of three types:
interviews, observations, and internal company proprietary documents. We interviewed 71
people who worked on the projects. The subjects were operational or middle level managers,
although their functional responsibilities and experience level varied widely. All interviews
followed the same general protocol, which combined focused questions about approaches to
integration with more unstructured discussion. The interviews lasted from about one hour to over
two hours and were recorded on audiotape and transcribed shortly thereafter.
In addition, one researcher spent 2-3 months on-site at each firm where she had the
opportunity to observe a variety of formal and informal meetings, discussions and events.
Proprietary documents and internal tracking databases yielded information on project outcomes.
Other internal materials used in the study included organization charts, product planning
documents, engineering diagrams, project accounting reports, materials for internal training and
education programs, and internal reports and memorandum, although the sources were not
uniformly available across projects. In all cases, we attempted to verify and reconcile findings
across sources (described below).
Analysis and Outcome Assessment. We analyzed the data using methods for building
theory from case studies (Yin 1984; Eisenhardt 1989). We began by selecting pairs of projects
and listing similarities and differences between each pair and categorizing them according to
variables of interest, such as the presence or absence of a cross functional structure. Of particular
usefulness during this process were various forms of analytical matrices (Miles and Huberman
1984). These matrices not only facilitated cross firm and cross project comparisons but also
served to help reconcile the data across sources and standardize the largely qualitative data.
For example, interviews and internal documents yielded information on project
outcomes, although the dimensions of performance varied across data sources and projects. We
therefore constructed an unordered effects matrix, which summarized evidence of positive and
negative performance outcomes along the dimensions of schedule, product component
integration, product quality, and team functioning. We also noted explanations for particular
outcomes in the display. A second form of outcome display was a case-ordered summed display
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of team reported problems, which ordered projects according to the type and severity of
problems.
RESULTS
This analysis centers on the product component integration process (referred to as the
"build" function at Microsoft and the "load" at Lucent). In this process, a project team integrates
or "knits together" software component pieces to form one working product. The following
quotation from a senior manager at Microsoft captures the centrality of this process in terms of
team functioning and activity coordination:
The build process by its very nature is a bottleneck. Everything developed has to pass
through the build. Testers can't test without it. Developers, program managers, and
product managers depend on it. These groups need clear and consistent expectations
about the build so they can plan their time and work accordingly.
The analysis identified three general approaches to product component integration. These
approaches differed along four dimensions: task allocation (the assignment of development,
testing, and integration tasks and their organizational and geographic relationship to the project
team), resource investment (the level of human and capital resources devoted to the process),
incentive structure (the mechanisms used to coordinate and control activities), and aspects of
timing. Below we compare and contrast these organizational solutions, illustrated by examples
from the cases, before linking them with performance outcomes. Table 1 and Figure la-c
summarize the organizational decisions that characterize the three approaches.
{ Show Table 1 about here}
{Show Figure la-c about here}
The first approach to product component integration that we discuss in this paper we call
the "big bang." Here, a project team periodically gathers all of the component pieces together and
integrates them at one time (Figure 1 a). One developer described this approach as "throwing all
of the software into a pot and stirring," and noted that on large projects:
It never makes soup, and we have no idea why or where it is broken. Then people have
to run around through the hallways quite a bit before we can get it to build.
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A second approach to component integration, the "roll up," sequentially brings together
bundles of related components. As opposed to "stirring soup," the image here is one of baton
passing. Different teams sequentially feed their components into an existing base and take
responsibility for making sure their components are consistent with what is in the base.
Typically, teams of developers and testers work on their components for a couple of weeks
followed by an integration roll-up period (Figure lb). For example, on the Data project, a one
week roll-up followed a development phase of 3 weeks.
The third type of component integration is the "continuous" approach. Whereas the big
bang and roll-up approaches share certain similarities, continuous integration is radically
different. Teams that followed this process established a core set of working functionality early
on and proceeded to build the product incrementally as different team members completed
various coding units or modules. The project performed the integration very frequently-usually
every night-but also quite dynamically depending on the needs of the project. Moreover, these
teams explicitly recognized the centrality of the process and made it a high priority in terms of
resource investment. In each case, a technically experienced group internal to the project
controlled integration, and they drew upon a variety of both structural and social incentive
mechanisms to ensure cooperation (Table 1, Figure 1c).
Three Approaches to Product Component Integration
The "Big Bang" Approach
The Tollphone and Autophone projects illustrate how projects typically organize the big-
bang approach as well as some of the consequences. Integration on these projects began
relatively late in the development cycle. It then occurred every 2-3 weeks on a fixed, preset
schedule that upper management determined. Inexperienced, non-technical contractors
performed the integration. They were organizationally affiliated with a support department and
geographically separated from the development and testing tasks. Developers were responsible
for coding and regression testing individual components, while feature testers handled cross
component testing. Developers had to submit their code by a deadline, after which the build team
performed integration, ran system tests, and released the working product to the team. Change
review boards assessed the priority, necessity, and impact of each change request before
engineers submitted the notifications. There was usually no penalty if a developer missed a
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deadline other than having to wait for the next integration cycle to begin approximately 2 weeks
later. Figure la illustrates this process visually.
Because developers work individually, they are essentially blind to the changes in other
pieces of code until the point of integration. One characteristic of component integration is
therefore that the number of bugs is proportional to the amount of time between integration
points. As the interval increases, the probability of design conflicts also rises:
If a lot of developers are making changes in the same code, bad things inevitably occur
because you can never test interactions that way. Say you have two people modifying
code at the same time. Each developer makes changes to the code, and they take those
changes and compile them. But each only sees his own changes. Each compiles against
the approved base and not against the other's changes. So each tests out OK individually,
but when you put them together it won't work.
This ignorance of parallel actions is equally problematic during testing and bug fixing
and caused significant problems in both Tollphone and Autophone. As one developer observed,
"[Bug fixing is] very error prone. Changes and solutions become meaningless if you iterate too
long because so much else has changed in the system." Long intervals between integration not
only make problem fixing more difficult, they also complicate problem identification because it
can be difficult to trace down the source of the problem after numerous, interdependent changes
have occurred. As a result, and somewhat ironically, a big bang approach often appears as more
frequent (corrective) builds:
We end up doing a series of corrective builds to fix some little problem to get over the
hurdle. They just keep popping them off like popcorn.
A second set of disadvantages associated with this approach arises from the nature of the
schedule. Because the project fixes integration points in advance, their frequency and timing
typically reflect some sort of average optimization across many competing needs. Furthermore,
the sheer size and number of changes usually results in a longer integration and system test
period. On the projects studied here, there was often a delay of up to 3 weeks between when a
developer actually submitted his code and when he got feedback. Such blocking negatively
impacted productivity and morale because there is a limit to what individuals can do without
integrating their work with others. People also tended to forget what they did after a 2-3 week
interruption, which further compromised problem-solving abilities.
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Finally, the big bang approach results in a high level of duplicate coordination effort on
the project because individual developers must collect component pieces and compile in parallel
between official integration points:
One person may have a piece of code. I need to access their code to make my part work.
But I don't know who has the code, and it takes time to coordinate and pick them all up.
And the coordination is duplicated because everyone is doing that. ....Another problem is
that the system starts to slow down. Fifteen or twenty people may be making changes
and compiling in parallel.
As alluded to in the second quotation, resource investment decisions made on the team
sometimes exacerbated this coordination inefficiency. In the two projects studied here, a series of
cost cutting measures that reduced the number of computers and reorganized integration support
had a negative impact on the process:
Computer expenses are quite tangible and therefore the focus of cost saving efforts. If I
sit here for a day and one-half waiting for a build or a compile to finish, well, they pay us
whether we sit here or not...This Spring the two loaders were moved out of our
organization and put in a support department. They eventually took other jobs. The new
people are novices who make a lot of errors and poor decisions. It's gone to strangers,
and the performance and commitment have dropped.
In summary, projects adopting a big bang approach to product component integration
tend to perform integration relatively late and infrequently on a fixed, preset schedule. In reality,
however, they rarely achieve this goal without significant problems. Developers take
responsibility for individual components, but the project delegates the integration process to
another department. The teams tend to rely upon formal rules and procedures to coordinate
activities (e.g., deadlines for making changes, change review boards), which people often ignore
and bypass.
The "Roll Up" Approach
The roll-up approach differs from the big bang in that integration is somewhat more
continuous, typically occurring several times during the development cycle and extending over a
longer period. Furthermore, integration is now a shared responsibility on the team, passed from
one group to another. The code ownership structure also differs. Whereas previously developers
owned components and had to get permission from other owners to make changes, ownership
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rules are usually weaker in a roll-up model. Teams are relatively free to make whatever changes
are necessary to get integration to work while they hold the baton.
One complication associated with the roll-up approach is that the teams need to identify
sequential and circular interdependencies in advance in order to determine the correct component
roll-up order. This can be difficult to do accurately, particularly when the technology is very
complex or new. In fact, the Data team struggled repeatedly to accurately identify the correct
sequence in their product:
Early on we tried to guess at what component depends on others for the rolling up, but we
couldn't even determine the order at that point. Later we felt a bunch of pain because it
was very difficult to do a weekly roll-up. By Wednesday, we usually found all sorts of
problems because the Forms [component] drop, which occurred the same day as the shell
[component] drop, didn't work with the new shell. Forms tested against last week's
version of the shell, which was perfectly reasonable to do because that's all they had
access to.
A predetermined roll-up sequence also introduces constraints such that a team has less
flexibility to alter the technology mid development cycle. This caused problems on the
Autophone project when the customer demanded some "late-in-the-game" adjustments to
delivery:
So we're trying to bring it together on a different schedule than originally planned.
We've all got our pieces-they're done and tested and ready to bring together-but now
we want to bring them together piecemeal. They want some of the functional areas, not
others, but the software is all wrapped up together. The problem is you don't have the
flexibility at this point to break functional dependencies because you didn't design the
code to deliver in that manner. Eventually, it becomes a crisis because everything and
everyone is blocked. In our case, an official integration load effectively blew up.
A second problem encountered on projects utilizing this approach is how to minimize
interference with production during the rolling up period. One option is to temporarily suspend
all new development during that phase, but this sacrifices valuable development time. Moreover,
developers typically continue to work on their components, resulting in an outpouring of new
code and code changes immediately after the freeze. More often, teams end up running dual
projects during the weekly roll-up; one code base for integration and a second for current
development. This in turn necessitates tracking and mapping code changes between the two
bases, which proved complicated and problematic on both of the projects studied here.
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In summary, a roll-up approach to component integration is characterized by alternating
phases of development and sequential component integration. As in the big bang model,
developers own components but now they also share responsibility for integrating those
components into the base. The project managers determine the integration schedule in advance,
but the number of formal coordination and control mechanisms is somewhat lower than that
found in the big bang model. Instead, peer level teams resolve differences and conflicts through
informal working relationships (Table 1).
The Continuous Approach
Two of the teams studied, Network and Handphone, followed the continuous approach to
component integration. In the Network project, a small, dedicated group internal to the Network
department performed the build; 3-4 people were directly responsible for integration and about 9
others tested the results and performed some miscellaneous activities. The build manager, who
had twenty years of experience in the software industry, believed very strongly that the build
team should play a "policeman or mother hen" role on the project in the sense of controlling both
the number and timing of code changes and their quality:
The quality of the build is inversely related to the number of check-ins. So sometimes we
'open the flood gates' and let everyone check anything in. Other times we use a more
controlled phased in approach where we will only allow changes in certain pieces but
keep everything else stable. Eventually, when the system gets full and buggy, we go to a
more restricted mode where people can only make changes that fix high priority bugs.
Handphone likewise organized product component integration as an internal team
function. Although the build manager had less experience than the Network build manager, she
worked closely and interactively with the feature engineer on the project.
In both cases, having direct control over the process enabled the teams to integrate
components selectively and dynamically, depending on the particular issues and problems that
arose. The teams maximized productive capacity by performing integration at night, thus
ensuring that developers had a fresh base of code to work with each day. This in turn led to fewer
integration problems since developers always had information on other peoples' changes and
potentially resulted in faster turnaround time during testing.
Managers on both of these teams indicated that they had thought carefully about how to
induce cooperation within the team without resorting to an overwhelming number of formal rules
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and procedures. The mechanisms they used to create incentives for developers to test and
regularly integrate their code changes provide a good example of the type of solution they
preferred to impose. Both build teams emphasized the professional responsibility associated with
submitting well-tested pieces of code. In Microsoft, incentives that combined aspects of public
humiliation and humor further supported this. For example, when a developer "broke the build"
he wore goat horns (symbolizing a competitor), had a sign on his door ("Buildmeister"), or paid
a small "fine." (The team eventually purchased a stereo with the money collected.) The
Handphone team at Lucent used a similar but more subtle prodding factor:
The first couple of times people were a little sloppy. They didn't have the discipline to
always compile and test their check in. So we sent them a notice via email-'You made
a mistake. It cost the team because every time we have to rebuild it costs a lot of time.'
It embarrassed people but then they got serious and made sure they didn't break it.
Note that, whereas Network used a very public humiliation scheme-potentially the
entire team (more than 200 people) knew when someone caused the build to fail-- Handphone
privately contacted individuals to point out the impact they were having. These modifications
were appropriate, given the very different demographic and cultural profiles in the two firms.
Lucent tends to hire a population of older workers who operate in a more respectful and
considerate work environment; widespread public humiliation and "goat horn" wearing would
have flown in the face of this tradition. However, the data also suggest that managers on both
projects targeted their use of incentives to particular personalities. For example, the Network
build manager noted that he sometimes communicated privately with developers who were more
sensitive to criticism, The Handphone manager would likewise occasionally resort to a public
reprobation if a developer was repeatedly careless.
In summary, integration was a high priority on these teams, as indicated by their level of
resource investment in it, and yet remarkably free of bureaucratic rules and procedures. Rather, a
small central integration team relied on structure and incentive mechanisms to pull work in on a
regular basis. Interdependency management under this approach was less about predicting or
fixing interdependencies in advance and more about responding to them as they occurred.
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Project Performance
Although the data on project performance are incomplete and subject to error, it is
possible to draw some tentative conclusions by looking across the data sources and analysis
methods.
Qualitative and Quantitative Outcomes. Network and Handphone both shipped on time
and experienced few significant software integration problems (Table 2). Data on product quality
(as represented by the number of post release bugs) was extremely limited, but neither project
appeared to have significant field problems. On Handphone, the number of pre-release bugs (all
severity levels) exceeded estimates, but the testing on customer site was very rapid and problem
free. The evidence on both projects is also very strong that team members found it to be a very
positive working environment. This was particularly true of Handphone, which more than one
person interviewed described as "the best working experience of my life."
{Show Table 2 about here.}
The data likewise suggest a clustering of results for the Data and Autophone projects,
which exhibited the big bang strategy. There was little if any evidence of positive outcomes, but
strong and consistent evidence of poor performance. Both projects experienced significant
shipping problems; the Data schedule slipped one year while Autophone was still slipping at the
last data collection point. Neither team was able to consistently achieve integration of product
components and used similar adjectives to describe the process (i.e., "very unreliable,"
"integration hell," "a nightmare").
For the Desk and Tollphone projects, the outcome and performance data are less readily
interpretable. The Desk release date slipped approximately fifteen days (less than 5% of the total
schedule), but the interviews largely attributed this to the fact that another major product went
through manufacturing at the same time. Desk had a large number of very severe bugs before
and after release, most of which were concentrated in the setup component. Data on the
Tollphone schedule and bugs was not available.
Both teams had problems performing software component integration. On Desk, the
application teams were working through issues of how to combine their processes. Tollphone
experienced some integration problems early on, but the team largely resolved these once it
converted to a new process. There appeared to be a moderate amount of conflict and chaos on
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each project, particularly Desk, but this was largely tempered by high experience levels, respect,
and a problem-solving attitude among the team leads.
We can tentatively conclude that, although Desk and Tollphone did experience some
negative performance outcomes, it is not entirely appropriate to classify them as poor performers
along with Data and Autophone, for two reasons. First, the interviews suggested that team
members and managers were quite aware of the sources of the problems and often had plans in
place to rectify them in the future. For example, the Desk group was already working on how to
reorganize the development of the setup component in the next release. Second, as noted earlier,
both projects were undergoing significant transition in their product architecture and product
market, which required them to change their processes. The Desk project was trying to integrate
five previously independent applications and converting from an unintegrated, asynchronous
product release to annual integrated shipment. The Tollphone project was almost moving in the
opposite direction-- from annual or biannual system release to continuous streams of smaller
functionality.
Reported Product and Process Problems. As described in the methods section, we also
classified the projects according to the type and severity of their self-reported problems. The
project clusters derived from this analysis largely support the conclusions drawn above. For
example, Autophone and Data each had major, on-going problems with product component
integration, defining the development process, and creating a standard working environment.
Handphone and Network, in contrast, each had only one major problem area (cross project
design and code sharing) and a scattering of minor issues.
DISCUSSION
This study examined the continuous day-to-day integration of individual work with the
activities of other team members. It focused on the product component integration process, a
nexus point for coordinating many different types of functional activities. Product component
integration problems are significant because they occur within an integrated system of
technologies, human actors, and tasks. Small delays and problems act as distortions in such an
environment, which reverberate throughout the system and produce disruptions, waste, and
inefficiency. A key proposition emerging from this study is that projects can derive performance
leverage off of designing this central process correctly. Just as the Japanese manufacturers
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demonstrated the power of leverage and system-level thinking in the production process, small
well-focused integration design decisions can produce significant, enduring improvements.
Other authors have previously written about the importance of component integration in
product development (Cusumano and Selby 1995; Ulrich and Eppinger 1995). The emphasis in
this previous work has primarily been on integration frequency; the earlier and more frequently a
team integrates components, the better the project performance. The present study supports that
conclusion but also offers an extension to theory by identifying some key process design
decisions as well as suggesting other performance benefits.
In particular, this study revealed that key organizational design enablors promote
cooperative behavior in the project, which affects the frequency with which integration can occur
and ultimately project performance. As team members experience the benefits of increased
cooperation and frequency, they in turn change their behavior and become more cooperative.
The result is a positively reinforcing cycle where integration frequency is a mediator of the
relationship between key up front design decisions and project outcomes.
What were some of the processes underlying this cycle? The analysis suggested that we
could group them under four general headings: facilitated management of internal and external
interdependencies, improved team productivity, enhanced motivation and morale, and self-
regulating cooperative behavior. Table 3 links the organizational design enablors with these
processes, illustrated by data from the cases.
{ Show Table 3 about here}
Facilitated Management of Internal and External Interdependencies. Continuous (daily)
integration facilitates. interdependency management by reducing the likelihood of coordination
conflicts. By integrating their work daily, developers keep abreast of changes and adapt their
software code accordingly. Maintaining constant progress on many fronts in this way also
reduces the likelihood of surprises later on by ensuring that "hidden" interdependencies surface
early and regularly:
A lot of time people don't realize that they are dependent on something. It's just not
obvious. For example, you don't realize that you have a dependency because you are not
familiar with that part of the code. Or a dependency that just sort of materializes out of
thin air because of a need and is often tracked informally. Or instances where the
solution to one dependency creates problems for a third party. The real problems occur
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with the hidden interdependencies-- the ones that no one thought about that pop up at the
last minute.
[Interdependency management] is like searching for a nugget of gold under one of one
million stones. You need to be very organized and invent a plan because it is too much
for a single person. A plan allows more than one human to cast his eyes over the
problem. If you don't do this regularly, two months or even one year goes by and stones
remain unturned. Then you turn one over and discover a monster has grown and will eat
you up.
Other researchers have also observed that one benefit of frequent iteration is that it
reduces the likelihood of unpleasant surprises as the product is assembled. A common problem,
for instance, occurs when different physical parts overlap or fail to work together (Sabbagh
1995).
Centralizing the coordination (in time and functional assignment) further eliminates so-
called "chain errors" and blocking where pieces of code are sequentially interdependent. In order
to compile and test a single piece of software, a developer usually needs to identify and gather
several pieces (some of which constitute non-obvious linkages):
For example, my software may depend on someone else's software. But just to get their
code together with my code to build these two together can be a big nightmare because
they may have code that is dependent on yet another person's code. And that stream can
go on and on. You can do it individually and have to deal with all of the dependencies
with everyone else, or you can put it into one spot and build it all at once.
Internal centralization also results in coordination flexibility and risk taking, which
benefited project performance. Because a team controls the process internally, the team can
apply the process dynamically and adapt it to correspond to the immediate needs of the project. It
also serves as a quality filter, enabling projects to take more risks while simultaneously being a
"good citizen" in the sense of not breaking functionality in other projects:
When product integration is managed by people internal to your team, it means you can
build selectively--only the pieces and times you want-in a more secure environment. If
you have problems, you don't have to worry about hurting other projects. It's also more
flexible, probably the biggest benefit, so you can take more liberties, beneficial liberties
early on.
A key enablor, besides integration frequency and centralization, appears to be a high
experience level on the build team. High levels of expertise ensure that complicated technical
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problems are solved efficiently. As one team member noted, "It's complex, there are so many
things that could go wrong, but if you deal with it on a daily basis, it gets easier." Projects where
the process was outsourced or assigned to non-technical consultants failed to capture the benefits
of this specialization. As a result, integration became a bottleneck-blocking progress and
creating lags between tasks and disruptions, which reverberated across the team as well as to
other projects within the company.
Improved Team Productivity. Continuous centralized integration saves human and
computer resources by eliminating duplicated coordination effort and blocking. By freeing up
resources, production activities become more efficient. Clear and consistent expectations about
integration also enable people to plan their time efficiently and effectively as well as modify
their work accordingly, as opposed to simply reacting to daily interruptions and crises.
Centralizing integration eliminates task duplication, thus saving human and computer
resources. In effect, the build team assumes the coordination role on the team, thereby enabling
developers to concentrate on production:
Say I make one line of code change. Then I need to compile and test that change.
Fifteen or twenty people may be making changes and compiling in parallel. One problem
is that the system starts to slow down. Now we do one compile for everyone. One that is
bigger, but that big one does not equal the sum of everyone's little ones. It's much, much
less.
The savings are more than mere CPU time, however, because now individual developers
do not have to spend time tracking down pieces of software that are interdependent with theirs.
Frequent integration ensures access to functional improvements in the product as they
occur, which directly enhances productivity and also reduces developer-to-developer blocking.
Perhaps more importantly and subtly, frequent integration improves the diagnostic and bug
correction processes. Diagnosis is easier because frequent integration "boxes" the search for
problems:
With a random process, when it breaks no one knows what is responsible. If you
incrementally throw things in and test as you go along, it boxes the problem of trying to
find the bug and it's easier to pinpoint the source of the problem; the bug is either in the
new thing or in the interaction between the new thing and X.
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Furthermore, as the interval between integration points increases, bugs and solutions in
some sense become less meaningful due to the addition of new code and changes. People
therefore waste time and effort either finding bugs that no longer exist or implementing solutions
that will not work in a new code context. Shortening the integration interval thus improves the
efficiency of the testing processes and potentially reduces testing intervals and turnaround testing
time.
Decisions about the distribution of responsibility in a team can result in further
productivity enhancements. For example, a dedicated build team develops experience at finding
(or forecasting) potential problems as a result of learning effects. As we saw in the cases, some
teams also make developers who create bugs responsible for fixing them. This ensures that
relatively weak or careless developers will spend more time fixing and therefore less time
creating new problems. Making developers responsible for the problems they create may also
reduce chum:
Now they are more likely to realize that 'Oh, if I change that interface it may break a lot
of things. What a pain.' It encourages them to search for other creative solutions and
helps reduce churn in the code because the pain is on the right person.
Enhanced Motivation and Morale. One of the challenges in a highly interdependent work
setting is how to minimize frustration levels and maintain motivation over the course of the
project. Frustration levels tend to increase, especially around deadlines or under schedule
pressure, when people are blocked because they need access to other pieces of code in order to
test their code or perform a fix. On very large projects, it can also be difficult to track progress;
hundreds of people may be actively working, but what exactly is the status of their combined
effort?
Continuous daily integration serves as a morale booster by keeping people on the team
motivated and convinced that things are moving along. Even when integration problems occur,
the team benefits from at least knowing the status. Regular integration also manages developer's
expectation levels; knowing a new build will be available again in 24 hours tends to reduce the
number of interruptions.
People also feel a sense of satisfaction and accomplishment because they see the
immediate benefit of what they have done. As one member of the Handphone team described it,
"When the first phone call rings successfully, it's really exciting!" Research by Karl Weick has
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similarly documented the positive motivational value of breaking a large task into a series of
small wins or incremental gains (Weick 1984).
Self-Regulating Cooperative Behavior. But perhaps the most interesting and important
function of centralized continuous integration is how it helps people to see the value of
cooperating and therefore promotes higher quality work and more cooperative behavior.
Centralizing the process increases the visibility of interdependence beyond a "near neighbor"
level of immediate interdependencies. Individuals are aware of the implications of their actions
on others because all work effectively stops when coordination problems occur and integration
fails.
Cooperative incentive mechanisms such as public humiliation and professional
responsibility further raise people's awareness of other's dependence on them. Other elements of
process design support and reinforce these mechanisms. In particular, performing integration
frequently and regularly makes it easier to pinpoint the cause of a given error. An internal
structure promotes a sense of ownership and responsibility:
When the process is more random, if it breaks no one knows who is responsible. This
way, it is easier to pinpoint and that changes developer's behavior.
Blocking is functional if it incents people to act. If people keep making changes but not
integrating, bugs never get fixed because they are not blocking anything. With daily
integration, people fix it because they don't want to be on the hot seat holding everyone
up.
Doing the integration internally can lead towards people wanting to do better code
because it's not Joe Schmo they're hurting-it's their teammate who now won't be able
to make the phone call work. It brings it very close to home if it's broken. With an
outsourced load, there is a perception that you never want to break that. But it's funny,
because even when you break it, what exactly are you breaking? You may be breaking
something that is completely divorced from you. So you don't feel the same ownership
for what you broke.
Note how cooperative behavior works in several directions-people have an incentive to
do things (remove bugs, test code) and not do things (chum code).
When a project has decentralized and random integration, in contrast, individuals feel
little if any "pain" when they change their work and negatively impact others. Under such
circumstances, people tend to develop a very fatalistic attitude about their work. As one
developer on the Autophone project observed, "I can't possibly guarantee that my change
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works." Such beliefs get translated into feelings of apathy ("It's way too big for me to care
about") and sloppy, careless behavior. In particular, developers tend to submit code without
evaluating the priority of the change or its potential impact and routinely fail to compile check
their code.
Creating a positively reinforcing cooperative cycle through process design has certain
other advantages as well. For one thing, it reduces the number of formal rules and ad hoc
organizational units (such as change review boards) needed. As one Network manager observed,
"A major advantage is the informality of it." Another benefit is the possibility of second order or
spill-over effects. Once people see the value and benefits of cooperation in component
integration, they may be more inclined to act cooperatively in general. Cooperation also becomes
more likely because centralization frees up resources:
When you asked somebody for something, they were always willing to make time for
you no matter how busy.
CONCLUSION
This article described an in-depth investigation of product component integration on six
large-scale new-product development teams. It identified some key organizational design
decisions as well as the underlying mechanisms that they activate and linked those factors with
project performance outcomes. A key argument in the study is that up front design decisions
associated with this process can trigger broad patterns of cooperative or non cooperative
behavior on a project.
In particular, product component integration in the two highest performing projects
served as both a central work coordinating process (by enabling team members to easily respond
and adapt to the latest work change made by others) and a motivational pacing mechanism (a
visible signal to both managers and team members of the current status and progress on the
project). As team members experienced the benefits of cooperation, they in turn changed their
behavior to act more cooperatively, effectively setting off a positively reinforcing and largely
self-managed cycle of cooperation. In essence, integration acted like a "heartbeat" on the team
serving as both a metaphor for keeping the entire team working smoothly and important
regulatory and pacing functions.
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One limitation of the study was its cross-sectional design. We observed each team
applying only one type of process and a large number of factors might account for the
performance outcomes. Yet the Desk and Tollphone projects had previously used an integration
process similar to that advocated here. Similarly, many individuals had experience with more
than one approach. Analysis of their interview data therefore permits direct comparison of
alternative approaches, controlling for project and individual differences. The results support the
conclusions reported here.
Finally, this work suggests several possible follow-up studies. First is the issue of how
applicable are the results to other settings and other types of technology. Centralization of the
component integration process as well as frequent integration may be more feasible in software
relative to other types of products given its inherent malleability. The basic idea and benefits of
frequent component integration, however, clearly apply much more broadly. Many companies in
different industries have product development processes that allow design or engineering
changes after an initial specification, or they attempt concurrent engineering and overlapping of
coupled tasks (Ulrich and Eppinger 1995). All of these kinds of projects must deal with similar
issues of integration and coordination as large-scale software projects.
In the automobile industry, for example, we have cases where companies accelerated
product development by frequent releases of information on design changes to teams
concurrently handling manufacturing preparations, such as building stamping dies. With each
change in the body design, the stamping die design team had to modify the die designs (Clark
and Fujimoto 1991). In the aircraft industry, Boeing recently built an entire aircraft, the 777,
using a computer-aided three-dimensional interactive application (CATIA) for the design
process. Using the new CAD technology made it possible to create an aircraft without building
physical prototypes. The project, however, required the continual integration of components
designed by 238 design and build teams. These teams totaled approximately 5000 engineers and
designed or integrated approximately 4 million components over a multi-year period (Sabbagh
1995).
A second issue is whether or not projects can apply the organizational design elements
identified here piecemeal or does the result depend on more of a "system" solution. The Network
and Handphone cases indicate that firms do need a system to integrate components continuously.
They need to coordinate the change-control and component integration processes as well as
24
create a culture where engineers are willing to cooperate and communicate. Nonetheless, the fact
that these two projects managed continuous integration somewhat differently indicates that
companies or projects have some flexibility with regard to how they design their system for
component integration.
A final related question for future research is how important other factors such as
integration frequency are in coordinating multiple interdependencies versus the design elements
identified here. Because this study confounded frequency with design, it was impossible to
disentangle the two. Similarly, component modularization and stable interfaces defining how
components should interact are important elements in architectural design as well as component
integration processes, for any type of product (Ulrich and Eppinger 1995).
Perhaps most importantly, this study illustrates the importance of approaching product
component integration as both a technical and very human process. The inherent scale and
complexity of the technology demand the application of sophisticated technical and analytical
methods. Yet what most distinguished the performance of teams in this study was their attention
to and understanding of the human dynamics behind this process. As researchers, we need to
open up the dialogue on this relatively narrowly studied topic. As one manager observed:
Product component integration is very much a social phenomenon, not just technical. We
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TABLE 3
KEY ENABLORS AND PROCESSES
Management of Team Productivity Motivation and Cooperative
Interdependencies Morale Behavior
* early and frequent · early and frequent · early and frequent · regular and frequent
Organization integration integration integration yield integration
Design * centralized * integration "small wins" * incentive
Enablors integration function centralized in time(at * centralized mechanisms for high
night) integration function quality work
* investment in yields visible (non)






* reduces likelihood * eliminates duplicate * frequent, small wins * reduced code chum
Specific of surprises by coordination; more yield a sense of * higher quality code
Elements of surfacing hidden resources available satisfaction and submissions
the Process interdependencies for production accomplishment · cooperation spill-
* greater flexibility * access to functional * reduced frustration over
· quality filter for improvements as they due to blocking
other projects occur * manages
· eliminates blocking * improved problem expectations (fewer
and errors due to diagnostic and fix interruptions and
sequential chains of processes crises)
interdependencies · reduced developer- * a visible metaphor
* secure environment to-developer blocking for large team
promotes beneficial * better planning
risk taking
"Since there are so "At certain times, "This was the hub. "Fear of infamy is an
Illustrative many people working especially late in the People were always incentive
Quotations in this project, it's development cycle, eager to see how the mechanism."
best if we can submit there are so many load was going. In
changes everyday and problems that have to the morning, people
there is someone get solved, so many were waitingfor it.
managing those tests to write and run, Once they submitted
changes and putting that the last thing a all their stuff they
them together." developer needs to couldn't wait until the
worry about is 'how load was ready so
"Having control of am I going to get a they could go test."
the build means you load to build and test
can define your own with?'"
schedule and build
and testfor your own "You can submit your
purposes." code today and have
it back tomorrow
"This gave us a instead of waiting 1-2
chance to debug and weeks forfeedback. "
test our stuff before it
went public. It saved
other projects a lot of
problems and time."
